In this letter, we consider two distributed game theoretic algorithms to jointly solve the problem of optimizing the transmission rates and transmit powers for future wireless data communication systems. We then establish the existence, uniqueness and Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria of both games.
I. INTRODUCTION
T RANSMITTERS in multimedia wireless networks may require different quality of services (QoS) in order to establish a communication link with a receiver. Providing flexible transmission rates for each transmitter/receiver pair and efficient use of the shared radio resources requires joint power and rate control optimization algorithms. Earlier work in this arena used centralized algorithms (c.f. [1] ). Due to the difficulty of implementing centralized algorithms, and to avoid control signals that cause delays in the system operation, distributed algorithms were proposed. Game theory was shown to be an appropriate tool for finding power control algorithms in [7] - [10] and for rate flow control algorithms in [4] and [5] . In particular, the authors in [7] proposed a utility based joint power and rate optimization algorithm, but the resulting Nash equilibrium (NE) point was Pareto inefficient and to guarantee the uniqueness of NE the rates of all users were forced to be equal. In this letter, we use game theory framework for finding a pure distributed algorithms for the joint rate and power control optimization problem. To solve the problem, we propose two, layered, but noncooperative priced games as follows: The first game allocates the optimal transmission rates for all users, then provides the second game with a vector of constants . The second game uses to evaluate the optimal transmit power levels that support the resulting Nash equilibrium transmission rates of game .
II. SYSTEM SETUP AND OUR APPROACH
Consider transmitter/receiver pairs (users) in a mobile cellular network. The th transmitter, transmits at a power level from its convex strategy space to the th receiver and sends data at a rate from its convex strategy space . The received power level at the th receiver from the th transmitter is given by where is Manuscript received January 11, 2004. The associate editor coordinating the review of this letter and approving it for publication was Prof. S. Pierre. The work of C. T. Abdallah was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under NSF-ITR 0312611.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/LCOMM.2004.833817 the path gain from the th transmitter to the th receiver. This gain may represent spreading gain and/or cross correlation between codes in CDMA systems or any gain that captures the effect of a fading channel. The game that optimally allocates the transmission rates for all users is given by (1) where , is the pricing factor broadcasted by the base station (BS) to all users, and (which measures the willingness of user to pay) is the utility factor of the th user locally selected based on the desired transmission rate. Finally, is a constant selected such that , and is the minimum required transmission rate. The first term of is chosen to maximize the transmission rate of user , while the second term works as a barrier to prevent the th user's rate from going below , and to fairly allocate the transmission rates. The goal of is to prevent the greedy use of the available channel capacity.
Game below, allocates the transmit power levels that support the resulting Nash equilibrium rates , of game .
(2) is the effective interference that user needs to overcome. Vectors and are the vectors of transmission rates and transmit powers of all users except for the th user, and is the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) defined by (3) In applications where the spectrum and power are limited resources, it is recommended to use a spectrally and power efficient modulation technique such as M-QAM. An empirical link rate model for -QAM of user is given by [2] :
(4) where with is the target BER of user and is a system constant. In this letter we use the following approximation of (4) at high SIR [1] : (5) where is normalized by the channel bandwidth with units, nats/s/Hz. A user can change the transmission rate by adapting 1089-7798/04$20.00 © 2004 IEEE different modulation formats (e.g., 2-QAM, 4-QAM, …). Therefore, the transmission rate of each user belongs to a discrete set, but we assume in this letter that the transmission rates are continuous for simplicity. In Section III we establish the existence, uniqueness and optimality of the equilibrium point of both games.
III. EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM

A. Non-Cooperative Rate Control Game With Pricing (NRGP)
The optimization problem of the th user defined in game is to find the transmission rate from the strategy space that maximizes the utility function defined in (1) . To do so, we set (6) The maximizing transmission rate of user , is thus given by (7) where and . Note that , , which means that is a strictly concave function of . Therefore, is a quasiconcave function optimized on a convex set , and game theory results guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium point [3] . In the remainder of this section we prove the uniqueness of this Nash equilibrium point. We first need the following result.
Proposition 1: For game defined in (1), the best response of user , given the transmission rates vector of the other users is given by: , where is the maximum allowed transmission rate in the th user's strategy space .
Proof: Define the best response function of the th user as the best action that user can take to attain the maximum pay off given the other users' actions . That is, , where this set contains only one point [9] . From (7), is the unconstrained maximizer of the target function , i.e., . Since is negative , this maximizer is unique. Now, assume that is not feasible, that is, , then user will get his/her maximum at since the target function is increasing on the set . This implies that is the best response of user given . The following theorem, proven in [6] , guarantees the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium operating point of game . Theorem 1: If a power control algorithm with a standard best response function has a Nash equilibrium point, then this Nash equilibrium point is unique.
See [6] for the definition of a standard function. Theorem 1 allows us to state the following lemma, whose proof is omitted.
Lemma 1: In game , the best response vector of all users given by is a standard vector function. Therefore, by theorem 1, game has a unique Nash equilibrium point .
B. Non-Cooperative Power Control Game With Pricing
To find the maximizing for game we evaluate: (8) and by substituting for the value of , the maximizing transmit power level is thus given by
The transmit power level represents the minimal power (i.e., without waste) required to support the optimal transmission rate , Note that , . Therefore, is a strictly concave function, and using the same argument for in , there exists a Nash equilibrium point in game . In what follows we prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium point of game by proposing the best response of user in game similarly to proposition 1.
Proposition 2: For game defined in (2), the best response of user , given the transmit power levels vector of the other users is given by: , where is the maximum transmit power level in the th user's strategy space .
Then, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium operating point can be proved similarly to game since the best response vector of users in given as is also a standard function. The following Lemma then guarantees Pareto optimality (efficiency) of the equilibrium point of both NRGP and NPGP games and , respectively. . Then we have the following:
(12)
In order to find out how behaves with , we need to find the first-order derivative of with respect to as follows:
where . One can check easily that , . Henceforth, ,
, that is, is decreasing over for all users, and by this we conclude that is a Pareto optimal NE point of NRGP game . To prove that is a Pareto optimal NE point of , it is enough to prove that is the minimum required transmit power to support for all . By re-writing (9) as: ,
And from (5), we conclude the proof.
It was proven in [6] that both synchronous and asynchronous algorithms with standard best response functions converge to the same point. Therefore, we consider asynchronous power and rate control algorithms which converge to the unique Nash equilibrium point of games and . In this algorithm, the users update their transmission rates and powers in the same manner as in [9] . Assume user updates its transmission rate at time instances in the set , with and for all . Let where with and define to be the transmission rates vector picked randomly from the total strategy space . Algorithm 1: Consider the game given in (1) 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider a wireless data system with receiver/transmitter pairs. The path gains were generated from a uniform distribution on for all and [1] . The additive-white-gaussian noise (AWGN) variance was set . Game was run for different values of the minimum transmission rates for different users. Results show that all users were able to reach reasonable transmission rates with low transmit power levels resulting from game as shown in the lower graph of Fig. 1 .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter two joint game-theoretic distributed rate and power control algorithms for wireless data systems were proposed. We presented target functions which are composed of the difference between a utility function and a pricing function to set the rules of the games among the users. We established the existence, uniqueness and Pareto optimality (efficiency) of the Nash equilibrium point of both games. All 50 users in the studied example were able to attain transmission rates that are higher than their minimum required transmission rates at very low transmit power levels.
